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T HE problem of jury misconduct has plagued attorneys since the
adoption of the Magna Carta. Since that time practitioners, concerned
that verdicts be reached fairly, have attacked the outcomes of jury trials on
the grounds that the jurors violated their oaths and instructions. In ad-
dressing jury misconduct, courts have been caught between two conflicting
policies. First, courts recognize that every litigant is entitled to a fair trial,
free from preconceived prejudices and outside influence. A juror's mis-
conduct can and often does deny this right. On the other hand, the jury's
verdict should be certain and final. A subsequent review of the jury's de-
liberations results in a trial on a trial. In their struggle to choose between
these two policies, Texas courts have created a body of law with peculiar
rules, practices, and presumptions governing jury misconduct cases that
affect every attorney engaged in litigation.
This Article analyzes this body of law by first reviewing the court's his-
tory of dealing with jury misconduct. The unique rules and procedures in
jury misconduct cases are then examined, focusing on their practical appli-
cation. Additionally, the Article investigates the two crucial elements of
misconduct and identifies the types and degrees of misconduct that usually
result in reversals of jury verdicts, as well as the type of conduct that is
generally found to be harmless.
I. HISTORY OF JURY MISCONDUCT
A. Lord Manffield's Exclusionary Rule
An historical review of jury misconduct is helpful in analyzing the cur-
rent status and application of the law. In 1785 Lord Mansfield, in a deci-
sion that has affected the jury system for almost two centuries, ruled that
jurors could not impeach their verdict by making affidavits or otherwise
testifying as to their own misconduct.I This radical departure from early
common law2 was based on the principle that a juror should not be al-
* B.A., Trinity University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Fort Worth, Texas.
I. Vaise v. Delaval, I Term Rep. 1I, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
2. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (2d ed. 1923). Previously litigants were free to
seek and introduce affidavits regarding the jury's activities. See also I C. MCCORMICK & R.
RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 394 (2d ed. 1956).
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lowed to "allege his own turpitude."'3 As a result of Lord Mansfield's rule,
evidence of jury misconduct can come only from third persons who over-
hear or witness the jury's actions, thus allowing eavesdroppers and spies to
testify to misconduct, but disallowing testimony of the jurors who have
firsthand knowledge of the events.4
Unfortunately, Lord Mansfield's exclusionary rule has survived to the
present and remains intact in the majority of jurisdictions. 5 The modern
rationalization is that the rule chooses between "the lesser of two evils" 6 by
deciding that the finality of jury verdicts should outweigh an attempt to
obtain perfect justice in each case.7 Likewise, some commentators have
,insisted that the rule protects jurors from harassment and the courts from a
subsequent trial on a trial.8
B. The Texas Experience
The Texas experience with Lord Mansfield's exclusion began with a dis-
agreement between the courts and the legislature. The courts wanted to
limit the granting of new trials for jury misconduct to give finality to judg-
ments, while the legislature wanted to ensure fair trials at the expense of
finality of litigation. In 1905 the Texas Legislature expressly repudiated
the exclusionary rule by adopting a statute that allowed jurors to testify
during hearings on motions for new trial based on jury misconduct. 9 The
statute provided that the trial court could in its discretion grant a new trial
if jury misconduct was proved.' 0 Initially, the courts disapproved of the
statute's abolition of the exclusionary rule because they feared that the jury
system would be disrupted with post-judgment attacks on jury verdicts. "
3. Note, Evidence-Testimony of Juror to Impeach Verdict, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 262
(1949).
4. Crawford v. State, 2 Yer. 60, 67, (Tenn. 1821); J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2352
n.2.
5. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
6. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).
7. Id See also Note, Affidavits of Jurors as Basis for a New Trial, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1373 (1948).
8. Bell, Restricting Grounds of Jury Misconduct, 25 TEX. B.J. 275 (1962); Comment,
Jury Misconduct in Personal Injury Litigation in Texas-A Needfor Further Reform, 21 Sw.
L.J. 494 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Jury Misconduct]; Comment, Impeachment of
Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360 (1958).
9. 1905 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 18, at 21. The original statute was Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 1371, which was subsequently revised in 1911 and 1925. The statute provided:
Where the ground of the motion is on account of misconduct of the jury or
the officer in charge or because of any communication made to the jury, or
because the jury received other testimony the court shall hear evidence
thereof, and it shall be competent to prove such facts by the jurors or others,
by examination in open court; and if the misconduct proven, or the testimony
received, or the communication made, be material a new trial may in the dis-
cretion of the court be granted.
The bill creating the statute passed quickly through the legislature and appears to have been
motivated by a statement in a Texas Supreme Court opinion relating that "the legislature
has never seen fit to alter" Lord Mansfield's Rule. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Ricketts, 96 Tex. 68,
71, 70 S.W. 315, 317 (1902).
10. 1905 Tex, Gen. Laws, ch. 18, at 21.
II. Kalteyer v. Mitchell, 110 S.W. 462, 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), afftd, 102 Tex. 390,
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Therefore, to ensure that successful attacks on verdicts were kept at a mini-
mum, the courts construed the statute to vest the trial court with absolute
discretion to review the alleged misconduct' 2 because the trial judge was in
a unique position to observe the jurors and their reaction to the parties and
presentation of the case. 13
Dissatisfied with the courts' interpretation of the statute, the legislature
in 1925 removed the discretionary power of the trial courts by amending
the statute to require a new trial if the misconduct was found to be mate-
rial. ' 4 The result of the 1925 amendment substantially changed the court's
approach to jury misconduct. In interpreting the new statute, the appellate
courts ruled that, once the complaining party established misconduct, 15 the
burden of proof shifted to the appellee to prove that harm did not result
from the misconduct. 16 The verdict had to be set aside if the reviewing
court had a reasonable doubt as to whether the misconduct harmed the
complaining party. '7 Under the 1925 statute, new trials were granted fre-
quently, often for trivial misconduct.' 8 According to one commentator,
the appellate courts 'presumed harm upon a showing of misconduct, rea-
soning that jury misconduct was a matter of public concern and therefore a
matter about which the legislature could speak arbitrarily."' 9 This liberal-
ity in the granting of new trials based on misconduct lasted from 1925 to
1941, until the adoption of rule 327.
II. MISCONDUCT UNDER RULE 327
The disagreement between the courts and the legislature ended in 1941
with the adoption of rule 327,20 which was a part of the first court adopted
117 S.W. 792 (1909); Foley v. Northrup, 105 S.W. 229, 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ refd);
Comment, New Trial-Misconduct of Jurors, 15 TExAs L. REV. 101, 104 (1936).
12. M.H. Wolfe & Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 144 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas
1912, writ refd); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Brown, 140 S.W. 1172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, no
writ); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Blalack, 128 S.W. 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aI#'d, 105 Tex.
296, 147 S.W. 559 (1912).
13. Comment, Jury Misconduct, supra note 8, at 496.
14. Former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2234 (1925), provided:
Where the ground of the motion is misconduct of the jury or of the officer in
charge of them, or because of any communication made to the jury or that
they received other testimony, the court shall hear evidence thereof from the
jury or others in open court, and may grant a new trial if such misconduct
proved, or the testimony received, or the communication made, be material.
15. Not all evidence of misconduct was held to be admissible under the rule. See text
accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
16. Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Long, 140 Tex. 494, 168 S.W.2d 642 (1943).
17. Id
18. 1 R. RAY, TExAs LAW OF EVIDENCE § 394 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980).
19. Comment, Jury Misconduct, supra note 8, at 496 (emphasis in original). See also
Parker v. Bailey, 15 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). In Parker
the commission of appeals, prior to the 1925 amendment, acknowledged that the right to
trial by jury and the "delicacy of any fact inquiry as to the probable effect of the trial court's
misconduct" in communicatin* with the jury is a "matter of such public concern as to be
well within the [legislature's] right to speak arbitrarily." Id at 1035.
20. TEx. R. Civ. P. 327, provides:
Where the ground of the motion is misconduct of the jury or of the officer in
charge of them, or because of any communication made to the jury or that
19811 1133
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rules of civil procedure. 21 In drafting rule 327, the supreme court did not
return to the unlimited discretionary power vested in the trial court by the
1905 statute. Instead, it merely added a phrase to the 1925 statute that
stated that the verdict would be overturned only if the misconduct resulted
in "probable injury" to the complaining party.22 This probable injury rule
was adopted as part of a broad scheme in the new rules of civil procedure
to eliminate the former practice of granting the reversal of judgments and
jury verdicts due to trivial and inconsequential error.23 The supreme court
wished to adopt a rule that would limit appeals and lend finality to judg-
ments except in cases in which the jury misconduct probably caused injury
to the complaining party.24
A. The Test for Misconduct Under Rule 327
The language of rule 327 requires the court to find three elements before
it overturns a verdict for jury misconduct: (1) an act of misconduct, (2)
that is material, and (3) that causes the complaining party probable in-
jury. 25 In practice, however, the courts assume that any misconduct is ma-
terial, and hence the only two relevant inquiries are: (1) whether
misconduct actually occurred; and, if so, (2) whether it caused probable
injury to the complaining party.26 Rule 327 clearly places the burden of
proving both the act of misconduct and the probable injury by a prepon-
derance of the evidence on the complaining party.27
they received other testimony, or that a juror gave an erroneous or incorrect
answer on voir dire examination, the court shall hear evidence thereof from
the jury or others in open court, and may grant a new trial if such misconduct
proved, or the testimony received, or the communication made, or the errone-
ous or incorrect answer on voir dire examination, be material, and if it reason-
ably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion and the
trial of the case and from the record as a whole that injury probably resulted
to the complaining party.
21. In 1941 the legislature gave the supreme court power to adopt rules of civil proce-
dure under certain formalized procedures; at the same time the legislature repealed all laws
that dealt with civil procedure. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 173 1a (Vernon 1962); see
Calvert, The Development of the Doctrine of Harmless Error in Texas, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 8
(1952).
22. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327.
23. Calvert & Perrin, Is the Castle Crumbling? Harmless Error Revisited, 20 S. TEX. L.J.
1 (1980).
24. 1 R. RAY, supra note 18, § 394. Ray observed that early cases under rule 327
demonstrated a tendency of the supreme court to find probable injury once material miscon-
duct was demonstrated. In fact, he stated: "[I]t may well be doubted whether Rule 327 has
wrought any substantial change from the former rule of presumed injury." Id § 394, at 385
and cases cited therein.
25. Pope, Jury Misconduct and Harm, 12 BAYLOR L. REV, 355, 360 (1960).
26. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980) (On motion
for rehearing the supreme court withdrew a portion of its judgment affirming the trial court
judgment and remanded the case to the court of civil appeals for further proceedings for
review of an insufficient evidence point that had been overlooked by that court. 24 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 46 (Oct. 18, 1980).); 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 14.46.1 (rev. ed.
1970).
27. Pope, supra note 25, at 356-57; Civil Procedure, 5 TEX. B.J. 168, 170-71 (1942). The
first supreme court case to place the burden of proof on the complaining party under rule
327 was Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943). The court, in explain-
1134 [Vol. 34
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B. Motion for New Trial
Affidavit Requirement. Rule 327 allows the complaining party to raise the
issue of jury misconduct on a motion for new trial.2 8 All the requirements
under the relevant rules of civil procedure must be satisfied in order prop-
erly to present the motion for new trial to the trial court.2 9 The supreme
court in one of its early decisions under the rule, however, added one addi-
tional requirement unique to jury misconduct cases that is not listed in the
rules of civil procedure. 30 The actual motion for new trial must be accom-
panied by affidavits setting out the act of misconduct allegedly committed
by the jury. 3 1 The affidavits must affirmatively show that the affiants are
qualified to testify and that the matters sworn to are admissible in evidence
at the motion for new trial.32 If such affidavits are not available, the com-
plainant must set forth a reasonable explanation of the reason the affida-
vits cannot be obtained, together with a disclosure of the specific
allegations of misconduct relied upon. 33 If either the affidavits or the ex-
planations and disclosures are filed, the trial court must hear actual testi-
mony during the hearing on the motion for new trial.34 Conversely, if
neither the affidavits nor the explanations and disclosures are filed, the
trial court within its discretion can refuse to hear testimony of the miscon-
duct. 35 The supreme court adopted the practice in the case of Roy Jones
Lumber Co. v. Murphy,36 indicating that the rationale for the rule was to
ing the new rule, stated: "[l]ts effect is to abolish the prior rule ... which imposes upon the
party asserting misconduct the burden not only of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that such misconduct occurred, but also of showing that such misconduct probably
resulted in injury to him." Id at 515, 169 S.W.2d at 464.
28. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327. Actually, there are two procedural vehicles for raising jury
misconduct: (I) motion for mistrial and (2) motion for new trial. The choice between the
two is determined by the time the misconduct is first discovered by the court or complaining
party. Virtually all jury misconduct hearings are heard on motions for new trial since the
alleged misconduct usually occurs after the evidence stage of the trial during the jury's delib-
eration. In some instances, however, the misconduct comes to the attention of the court and
parties before the deliberation, and the complaining party should make a motion for mistrial
at that time. While the question has never been directly addressed by Texas courts, a failure
to make a motion for mistrial apparently does not waive a subsequent motion for new trial
on the same acts of alleged jury misconduct. Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478,
314 S.W.2d 277 (1958).
29. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320-22, 324, 326-29(b).
30. Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 139 Tex. 478, 163 S.W.2d 644 (1942).
31. Id at 482, 163 S.W.2d at 646. Before the decision, there had been conflicting au-
thority as to whether affidavits were necessary on a motion for new trial under rule 327. The
commission of appeals, in an opinion adopted by the supreme court, stated that the reason
for requiring affidavits was that, "[tihe only remedy against 'fishing expeditions' where mis-
conduct is charged, is to require that, by affidavits, the movant shall prove his good faith,
and, by particularizing, demonstrate that his allegations of misconduct are based upon
knowledge and not suspicion or hope." Id at 483, 163 S.W.2d at 646 (quoting Freedman
Packing Co. v. Harris, 160 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Civ. App. - Galveston 1942, writ dism'd
w.o.m.)).
32. Cortez v. Medical Protective Co., 560 S.W.2d 132, 136-37 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 139 Tex. 478, 163 S.W.2d 644 (1942).
34. 1d. at 483, 163 S.W.2d at 646.
35. Id
36. 139 Tex. 478, 163 S.W.2d 644 (1942).
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prevent "fishing expeditions" into the possibility of jury misconduct.37
This affidavit requirement, however, does not obviate the necessity of ac-
tual testimony on the motion for new trial.
Testimony Requirement.
"Mental Processes" versus "Overt Act. " The complainant has the bur-
den of proof and must introduce admissible testimony during the hearing
on the motion for new trial.38 In almost every instance this testimony will
come from the jurors themselves. While a juror's testimony regarding jury
misconduct is freely admitted in Texas, the scope of inquiry into the proc-
ess has been severely limited. In another practice unique to jury miscon-
duct cases, Texas courts have adopted the position that jury misconduct
cannot be demonstrated by introducing the mental thought processes and
motives of the jurors into evidence.39 Only evidence of overt acts is admis-
sible to prove misconduct. 40 As a result, it is necessary, although often
difficult, to distinguish between the inadmissible mental processes and the
admissible overt acts of the jurors.
Rationale for the Rule. Initially, the "mental processes" versus "overt
act" rule seems illogical because it prevents the jurors from directly testify-
ing as to the effect on them of the alleged acts of misconduct. The ration-
ale for the rule is sound, however, and has as its basis the policy that
thought processes are difficult to ascertain and impossible to verify. Texas
Supreme Court Justice Pope, after many years on the bench, itemized the
justifications for the rule that allows jurors to testify to overt and definable
actions, but prevents them from testifying about matters of the mind.4'
First, jurors are not aware of all of the factors that might influence them
during a trial of the suit and are not qualified to serve as their own analyst.
Secondly, the question of probable harm is a question of law to be decided
by the court on the entire record. Thirdly, a juror's subjective thought
processes are incapable of verification and thus should not be used to over-
turn a jury verdict. 42
Application of the Rule. Although the "mental processes" versus "overt
act" rule appears simple in the abstract, it creates a problem in application.
As stated by Justice Pope: "The line at which thought becomes act is va-
porous. ' 43 For example, speech is an overt act and is admissible to prove
misconduct but thought is a mental process and as such is not admissible.
37. Id. at 483, 163 S.W.2d at 646.
38. Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943).
39. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980); Trousdale v.
Texas & N.O.R.R., 154 Tex. 231, 276 S.W.2d 242 (1955); City of Houston v. Quinones, 142
Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).
40. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980).
41. Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1962).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 853.
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Speech, however, is nothing more than a verbal expression of thought,44
and allowing the former into evidence while excluding the latter seems
somewhat specious. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
evidence of a juror's mental process should never be admitted into evi-
dence at the hearing. 45 Moreover, if the evidence is admitted without ob-
jection, it is incompetent evidence and cannot be considered by the courts
in overturning a jury verdict. 46
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.- The Implied Finding Rule
In reviewing the admissible evidence introduced on a motion for new
trial, appellate courts have adopted a rule of presumption that disposes of
many appeals without an extensive examination of the facts. The implied
finding rule provides that if no findings of fact or conclusions of law are
filed, the appellate court must presume that all controverted facts were
found in favor of the appellee and supported the overruling of the motion
for new trial; that is, the misconduct did not occur.47 Equally important, a
comparable rule applies at the trial court level. If the record demonstrates
that the evidence is conflicting as to whether the misconduct occurred, in
the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court, as the
trier of fact, may choose to believe all or part of the testimony presented on
the motion for new trial or disregard it completely. 48 This rule does not
operate, however, when the trial court's ruling is contrary to all of the con-
clusive evidence. 49 Likewise, the implied finding rule does not apply to the
court's finding of probable harm because such a determination is a ques-
tion of law rather than a question of fact.50 As a result, the appellate court
is not bound by the trial court's determination on the subject.5'
Thus the complainant without exception should request conclusions of
law and findings of fact in the event that the trial court overrules its motion
for new trial.52 Otherwise, the complainant will be adversely affected by
the implied finding rule. The procedures, presumptions, and rules in jury
misconduct cases appear to have been created to prevent the granting of
44. Comment, Jury Misconduct, supra note 8, at 498.
45. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980); Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n v. McCaslin, 159 Tex. 273, 317 S.W.2d 916 (1958).
46. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980).
47. 1d. Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943); Monkey Grip Rub-
ber Co. v. Walton, 122 Tex. 185, 53 S.W.2d 770 (1932).
48. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hearks, 144 Tex. 317, 190 S.W.2d 62 (1945). In many cases,
the evidence of the jurors is conflicting. In fact, contradictions often occur within the same
juror's testimony. Heflin v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry., 207 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
49. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup Ct. J. 594 (Sept. 12, 1980); Fountain v. Fergu-
son, 441 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Roming v. McDonald, 514
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
50. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 595 (Sept. 12, 1980); Trousdale v.
Texas & N.O.R., 264 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953), afd, 154 Tex.
231, 276 S.W.2d 242 (1955).
51. Scoggins v. Curtiss & Taylor, 148 Tex. 15, 219 S.W.2d 451 (1949); Motley v.
Mielsch, 145 Tex. 557, 200 S.W.2d 622 (1947).
52. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
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motions for new trial in all but the most compelling cases; these unique
rules often operate to prevent the complainant from presenting an ade-
quate case for reversal.
III. ELEMENTS OF JURY MISCONDUCT
In the four decades since the adoption of rule 327, Texas courts have
often dealt with the problem of jury misconduct and an analysis of the
court's decisions can best be undertaken by examining the cases according
to the two elements of rule 327, that is, (1) whether there was a material act
of misconduct, and (2) whether the act caused probable injury. By exam-
ining the maze of cases and the various acts that the Texas Supreme Court
has deemed to constitute jury misconduct, the Texas practitioner may bet-
ter determine his chances of success in moving for a new trial.
A. Acts of Material Misconduct
Realizing that the best time to prevent jury misconduct is before it oc-
curs, the supreme court adopted rule 226a, which provides for admonitory
instructions to be given to the jury panel and jury during various stages in
the jury process.53 The provisions of rule 226a are mandatory, and it is
error for a court to refuse to instruct the jury in accordance with the rule.5 4
Since the main purpose of the instructions is to ensure a fair trial to all
parties, numerous acts of misconduct are mentioned in the instructions;
and the jury is warned that any act of misconduct can result in an over-
turning of the jury verdict. 5 The following subsections illustrate the spe-
cific acts of misconduct prohibited by rule 226a and analyze the courts'
review of the individual acts of misconduct.
Tampering- Contact with Persons Connected with the Litigation. Rule
226a(I)(l)-(2) prohibits jurors from having any contact with persons con-
nected with the litigation in any manner except to exchange casual greet-
ings. Texas courts have dealt harshly with litigants who have violated this
rule and have consistently overturned jury verdicts upon a finding of tam-
pering. The leading case on tampering is Texas Employers' Insurance As-
sociation v. McCaslin. 16 During one of the recesses, the plaintiff went to a
juror's office and asked the juror to do all that she could to help the plain-
tiff.57 The supreme court found that the contact was an act of misconduct
53. Id. 226a. The rule requires that certain oral and written instructions should be
given to all jurors during various stages of the examination. The rule is extraordinarily
lengthy, and will not be paraphrased or quoted here. The various provisions of the rule,
however, will be mentioned in the discussion of the acts of misconduct.
54. Central Power & Light Co. v. Freeman, 431 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). While the rule requires the trial court to give these
admonitory instructions, a party may waive any right to complain if it fails to make a timely
objection to the court's failure to so instruct the jury. Dealers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 421
S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
55. TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a(l).
56. 159 Tex. 273, 317 S.W.2d 916 (1958).
57. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McCaslin, 312 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
1138 [Vol. 34
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and held that some acts are so highly prejudicial "that the burden of going
forward with proof of harm is met, prima facie at least, by simply showing
the improper act and nothing more."' 58 The court based its decision on the
Texas Constitution's grant of an inviolate right to a jury trial "unaffected
by bribes, promises of rewards [or] improper requests."' 59 In reaching this
decision, the court appears to have shifted the burden of proof away from
the complaining party as called for under rule 32760 and presumed the
existence of probable harm once tampering was demonstrated. 6'
Not every contact between a juror and party to the litigation, however,
carries this presumption of harm. The Texarkana court refused to find
material misconduct in a case in which a juror solicited a ride from the
plaintiff's brother because of evidence that the case was not discussed dur-
ing the ride.62 The El Paso court determined that the mere fact that jurors
accepted coffee furnished by the plaintiffs lawyer did not cause reversal on
the basis of jury misconduct. 63 Thus the presumed harm doctrine of Mc-
Caslin will not apply in every instance of jury contact with persons alleg-
edly interested in the litigation. Nevertheless, McCaslin demonstrates that
such contact may result in overturning a jury verdict when parties to the
lawsuit deliberately try to approach and influence members of the jury.
Liability Insurance and Ability to Pay. Rule 226a(II)(9) prohibits the jury
from considering, discussing, or speculating whether any party is protected
by insurance. In its first decision interpreting rule 327, the supreme court
in Barrington v. Duncan64 held that the consideration of insurance is an act
of material misconduct that mandates reversal of the jury verdict. 65 The
kana), rev'd, 159 Tex. 273, 317 S.W.2d 916 (1958). The court of civil appeals' opinion also
notes that the plaintiff sought to ingratiate herself by calling the juror "honey" and inquiring
after the juror's family. 312 S.W.2d at 594.
58. 159 Tex. at 279, 317 S.W.2d at 921.
59. 1d. at 275, 317 S.W.2d at 919.
60. See Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943), discussed in note
27 supra.
61. For a case following McCaslin, see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 404 S.W.2d
52 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The San Antonio court reversed
the trial court and overturned a jury verdict upon proof that the plaintiff, in a trial for total
disability benefits, approached a juror and asked for aspirin. The court ruled that the act by
its very nature was so prejudicial that probable harm was presumed.
62. Hunnicutt v. Clark, 428 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ).
Although the evidence was in conflict, the court found that the plaintiff's brother had no
pecuniary interest in the case, was not a witness, and was therefore so removed from the case
as not to come under the prima facie rule announced in McCaslin.
63. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Moore, 549 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977, no writ). Courts have likewise been reluctant to overturn verdicts for jurors' com-
ments on the defendant's ability to pay or the respective wealth of the parties. In McAllen
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Alvarez, 581 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1979,
no writ), one juror stated during the deliberations that Coca Cola was such a large corpora-
tion that it would not be affected by a large verdict. The Corpus Christi court refused to
overturn the jury verdict because there was no indication of probable harm to the defendant.
Id. at 204.
64. 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943).
65. Id. at 516, 169 S.W.2d at 465. The plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries in
an automobile accident. At least one of the jurors who was familiar with the trucking indus-
try stated that a truck such as Barrington's had to carry at least $10,000 worth of insurance to
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courts, however, have since retreated from the view expressed in the Bar-
rington decision, and by 1956 the supreme court held in Putman v. Laza-
rus66 that the mere mention of insurance does not constitute material
misconduct that would require reversal of the judgment. 67 Since the
Putman opinion, the courts have repeatedly held that the mention of in-
surance, especially when not shown to have increased the amount of the
verdict, does not require the overturning of the jury verdict. 68
Attorneys'Fees. Rule 226a(II)(8) prohibits the discussion or consideration
of attorneys' fees unless evidence of the fees is admitted into testimony.
Early decisions under rule 327 held that jury consideration of attorneys'
fees when considering the amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff
was material misconduct. 69 The overturning of the jury verdict was neces-
sary when it was proved that the jury increased the amount of damages to
ensure that the plaintiff would have an adequate sum left after paying the
lawyer. 70 In White Cabs v. Moore7 1 the supreme court held that every
mention of attorneys' fees does not constitute misconduct sufficient to war-
rant a reversal. 72 In that case, however, nine jurors testified that some of
the jurors had stated that they wanted the plaintiff to have an adequate
amount of money left after paying attorneys' fees to get started -again in
business. 73 The supreme court overturned the jury verdict even though the
remarks were swiftly rebuked by the jury foreman because the jury did
increase its award after the conversation.74 In most recent cases, however,
courts have been more reluctant to overturn the jury's verdicts for consid-
eration of attorneys' fees75 based on the rationale that a casual mention of
attorneys' fees, which is promptly rebuked, is not material misconduct. 76
A recent court of civil appeals decision demonstrated that although the
courts will not reverse a jury verdict for a mere mention of attorneys' fees,
operate on state highways. Even though there was evidence that the comment was swiftly
rebuked, the jury awarded $10,000, the exact policy limits of Barrington's liability policy.
66. 156 Tex. 154, 293 S.W.2d 493 (1956).
67. Id at 158, 293 S.W.2d at 495.
68. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 598 (Sept. 12, 1980); St. Louis S.W.
Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Butler v. Haynes, 426 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex.
Civ. App,-Beaumont 1968, writ refd n.r.e.). See also Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1299 (1973).
69. White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 105, 203 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1947).
70. Id. at 106, 203 S.W.2d at 202.
71. 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200 (1947).
72. Id. at 105, 203 S.W.2d at 201.
73. Id at 106, 203 S.W.2d at 202.
74. One commentator has indicated that the supreme court reversed on the cumulative
effect of the discussion of attorneys' fees and other misconduct prejudicial to the defendant.
Comment, Jury Misconduct, supra note 8, at 507 n. 103. The clear reading of the case, how-
ever, suggests that the sole reason for reversal was the discussion of attorneys' fees.
75. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 597 (Sept. 12, 1980); McAllen
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Alvarez, 581 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ); Lantex Constr. Co. v. Lejsal, 315 S.W.2d 177, 185-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 597 (Sept. 12, 1980). In Strange
there was no evidence that the jury had increased their award as a result of the mention of
attorneys' fees.
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if the amount of the jury's verdict is affected by the speculation on attor-
neys' fees, a reversal will result.77
Evidence Outside the Record. Rule 226a(II)(5)-(7) prohibits jurors from
making independent investigations, inspections, observations, views, or ex-
periments. Additionally, jurors are prohibited from relating any personal
experiences or special knowledge to the other jurors and are strictly pro-
hibited from considering any matter outside the record.78 According to
rule 226a(II)(5), all evidence must be presented from the witness stand so
that each side may examine the witnesses and make proper objections.
Common Knowledge Versus Special Knowledge. The courts have refused
to allow jurors to relate any special knowledge regarding the subject mat-
ter of the litigation. 79 Otherwise, jurors become secret witnesses whose tes-
timony is not scrutinized by the attorneys and the court. Jurors are free,
however, to discuss matters of common knowledge, which has been de-
fined as "elemental experiences in human nature, commercial affairs, and
everyday life as affected by local conditions." 80 Obviously, distinguishing
special from common knowledge is a difficult task. Crawford v. Detering
Co. ,81 a car-truck collision case, is the landmark case distinguishing com-
mon knowledge from special knowledge. 82 The special issues submitted in
the court's charge required the jury to consider what opportunity a truck
driver had to stop his truck. One juror, a bus driver, upon a question from
another juror, related to the jury a series of tests conducted on buses that
indicated stopping time. Following this comment, three jurors changed
their vote, apparently as the result of the information regarding the bus
tests. The supreme court reversed the verdict, ruling that information of
the tests was specific knowledge and constituted misconduct. 83 In distin-
guishing between specific and common knowledge, the court adopted a
surprisingly practical test. If the other jurors on the panel already know
the information, it is common knowledge; if not, it is special knowledge
and is prohibited.84 The test is a subjective one and requires the complain-
77. Kastanos v. Ramos, 581 S.W.2d 740, 741-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, no writ). When considering the amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff, the jurors
estimated that between 65% and 67% of the award would be given to plaintiff's lawyer. The
court assumed that the jury's consideration of attorneys' fees caused a higher verdict to be
rendered than would ordinarily have been the case. While evidence of misconduct was in-
troduced at the motion for new trial, the court also had the benefit of a note from the jury
foreman inquiring how much of the jury verdict would be given to the plaintiff's attorney.
See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kennedy, 403 S.W.2d 909, 910-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1966, writ refd n.r.e.).
78. 581 S.W.2d 740, 741-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
79. Motley v. Mielsch, 145 Tex. 557, 200 S.W.2d 622 (1947); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Hearks, 144 Tex. 317, 190 S.W.2d 62 (1945).
80. 30 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 631 (1952).
81. 150 Tex. 140, 237 S.W.2d 615 (1951).
82. Not only is the case a landmark, but it is the only supreme court decision dealing
directly with the common knowledge versus special knowledge dichotomy.




ant to elicit the extent of the jury's knowledge at the hearing on the motion
for new trial.85 Since Crawford, the supreme court has not had another
opportunity to consider the special versus common knowledge question,
86
and thus the rule in Crawford remains in effect. 87
Personal Knowledge.88 Rule 226a(II)(7) prohibits jurors from sharing
personal experiences with other jurors. A juror's personal knowledge may
involve the case in question, but no information about the case should be
divulged unless it has been introduced in evidence. Although error due to
injection of personal knowledge can be limited by an effective voir dire
examination, the situation may arise during jury deliberations. Rule 327
provides that a new trial may be granted if a juror failed to answer or
falsely answered any of the questions on the voir dire examination. If,
however, a juror does have some personal knowledge of the event in ques-
tion or one similar to it and the panel is not adequately examined on voir
dire, the courts can hold that any error due to jury misconduct is waived. 89
Many cases have been decided in Texas dealing with misconduct result-
ing from a juror's personal knowledge. In St. Louis & Southwestern Rail-
way v. Gregory90 one juror made a personal investigation of the accident
that was the subject matter of the lawsuit and discussed that investigation
with a fellow juror. The court found that the juror's private investigation
and sharing of the information with the jury was material misconduct. 91
The courts have also held that a juror's revelation of a special knowledge
of a general business, industry, or area of concern constitutes material mis-
conduct. 92 In City of Houston v. Quinones93 the supreme court ruled that a
85. Id. at 153-54, 237 S.W.2d at 622-23 (Wilson, J., dissenting). In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Wilson wrote that he believed the juror was using "common knowledge" derived
from his own experience in answering the issue and informing the other members of the
jury. Justice Wilson argued that the court's holding would endanger most jury verdicts if the
complaining party was diligent enough to make a thorough inquiry into the proceedings.
Instead, Justice Wilson proposed that verdicts should not be overturned unless the comment
"constitutes unsworn testimony of material facts." 1d. at 157, 237 S.W.2d at 625.
86. See Brawley v. Bowen, 387 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1965). The court was faced with an-
other opportunity to address the subject in a case in which one juror told the other jurors
that he worked in a garage and had peculiar knowledge of repairing automobiles and could
tell the extent of damages to the plaintiffs car. The court refused, however, to consider the
jury misconduct based on the "implied finding" rule.
87. But see Comment, Jury Misconduct, supra note 8, at 505, in which the author stated
his belief that the Brawley decision had the effect of modifying Crawford.
88. Special knowledge, discussed in the preceding section, is a juror's knowledge that
comes from advanced training or experience in an occupation, thereby giving that juror's
opinion added force. Personal knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge of the actual
facts surrounding the case in question or experience in very similar fact situations.
89. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 29-30 (Tex. 1967).
90. 387 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1965).
91. The court did not find, however, that the misconduct caused probable injury to the
plaintiffs. Id. at 32. Justice Greenhill dissented on the ground that a review of the evidence
showed that the jury could have had no other reason to answer as it did except for the
evidence it received from Bradford. Id at 34-35.
92. City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944); Vincent v.
Goodman, 568 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ); Lewis v. Cushing, 444
S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ).
93. 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).
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juror's statement that he had driven the same kind of machine as the de-
fendant and that the defendant could have seen the plaintiff from the
driver's seat of the machine constituted material misconduct and war-
ranted the reversal of the jury verdict. 94 Additionally, courts have found
jury misconduct in numerous other instances in which jurors related per-
sonal experiences or knowledge in the jury room. For example, miscon-
duct has been found in a child custody case in which (1) one juror stated
that the child's father could provide government scholarship funds, 95 (2)
members of the jury visited the scene of the event in question,96 (3) a juror
revealed knowledge of the settlement offers in the case, 97 (4) a juror re-
vealed the cost of a college education for minor survivors in a wrongful
death case,98 and (5) jurors testified to the jobs that a plaintiff could ob-
tain. 99 The general rule stated throughout the personal knowledge cases is
that jurors must not be allowed to become secret witnesses in the jury
room by attempting to influence other members of the jury with evidence
that did not come from the witness stand.'0°
Calculaior or Slide Rule. Texas courts have consistently held that, ab-
sent contrary instructions from the judge, jurors may use slide rules and
calculators during their deliberations.' 0' In Solana v. Hill1 0 2 the jurors
were required to consider relative speeds and distances in order to answer
the negligence issues. One juror used a slide rule to calculate the various
speeds and distances that were introduced into evidence. 0 3 The juror an-
nounced to the jury the results of his calculations, which indicated that two
of the defendants were not negligent. The plaintiff moved for a new trial,
evidently arguing that the use of the slide rule constituted new evidence in
the jury room and therefore was outside the record. 0 4 The Eastland court
of civil appeals ruled that no misconduct resulted as long as the calcula-
94. Id. at 289, 177 S.W.2d at 263. The supreme court overturned a jury verdict because
a juror stated his personal opinion on a crucial issue. The crucial issue in the case was
whether the defendant-driver had failed to keep a proper lookout.
95. Lewis v. Cushing, 444 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ).
96. Rodman Supply Co. v. Jones, 370 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no
writ).
97. Lewis v. Yaggi, 584 S.W.2d 487, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. Allen v. Riedel, 425 S.W.2d 665, 676-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, no writ).
99. Elston v. Sherman Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper Co., 596 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
100. Id.
101. Queen City Land Co. v. State, 601 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980,
no writ); Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Goldstein, 567 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Solona v. Hill, 348 S.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1961. writ refd n.r.e.).
102. 348 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
103. Id. at 483-84. All of the testimony on the motion for new trial showed that all
figures used in the calculation were introduced into evidence.
104. Id. at 483. Unfortunately, the opinion did not state what specific grounds were used
in alleging jury misconduct; the language indicated, however, that the complaint was based
on new evidence.
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tions were on figures introduced in evidence.' 0 5 To date, no Texas court
has dealt with a juror's use of a slide rule or calculator in a case in which
the juror used figures that might be outside the record, though there is little
doubt that such a calculation and the jury's use of the results would consti-
tute material misconduct. 0 6
Quotient Verdict. Rule 226a(III)(5) prohibits jurors from deciding dam-
ages by use of a quotient verdict. The term "quotient verdict" is given to
describe the frequent practice of the jurors' adding the sum that each one
thinks proper and dividing the total by the total number of jurors 0 7 in
order to determine damages. The quotient verdict practice is material mis-
conduct.' 0 8 To establish misconduct because of a quotient verdict, the
complaining party must prove two elements: first, an agreement among
the jurors to be bound by the final result; '09 and secondly, the actual result
of arriving at a verdict based on the figures." 0 The rationale for the rule
prohibiting quotient verdicts is that the practice substitutes an arbitrarily
ascertained figure for one reached by intelligent deliberation.,' Courts,
however, are reluctant to determine that a jury reached a verdict by the
quotient practice and seldom find that jurors agreed to be bound by the
final figure that was reached. 1"2 A good example is Queen City Land Co. v.
State,' 13 an eminent domain proceeding in which the plaintiff sought to
acquire an easement for a highway project. During the deliberations one
group of jurors adopted the valuation figure argued by the state, while one
juror held out for a considerably higher figure. In an effort to reach a
verdict, the jurors added the two figures and divided the total by two. The
court refused to reverse the trial court because there had been no advance
agreement to be bound by the figure. 14 The court also stated that the
verdict was reached by compromise, but compromise alone does not con-
stitute misconduct.' 15
Consideration of Effect of Answer. Rule 226a(III)(4) directs jurors not to
consider the effect of their answers. Material misconduct results when ju-
rors attempt to answer special issues in an effort to ensure judgment for
105. Id
106. Ornelas v. Moore Serv. Bus Lines, 410 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1966, writ refd n.r.e.). The court, without so holding, implied that calculating figures not in
evidence would be material misconduct.
107. R. McDONALD, supra note 26, § 14.13.
108. Ruffo v. Wright, 425 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
109. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
110. Id. at 491; see R. McDONALD, supra note 26. According to McDonald, the actual
harm in a quotient verdict is not great since the procedure is not a fatal resort to chance but
the result of an average of all the jurors' thoughts.
I 1I. See R. McDONALD, supra note 26.
112. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ);
J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Azios, 384 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
113. 601 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
114. Id. at 529.
115. Id.
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one of the parties. To prove misconduct, the complainant must demon-
strate that the jury has a "design or purpose" to give one of the parties a
judgment. Often jurors are intelligent enough to realize the outcome of
their answers, but misconduct does not result without an obvious scheme
to give one party a judgment. In Bell v. Buddies Super-Market, 16 a per-
sonal injury case, the court found that the jurors, by answering the liability
issues in the negative and subsequently neglecting to answer the damage
issue, indicated that the jury realized the effect of its answers.' '7 The court
did not grant a new trial for misconduct, however, because there was "no
design on the part of the jury to effect an end by their findings regardless of
the evidence."' 18
Personal Bias or Prejudice. Rule 226a(III)(1) directs jurors not to allow
bias, prejudice, or sympathy to play a part in their verdict. A juror's per-
sonal bias or prejudice for or against a party or a type of lawsuit can be
material misconduct if it is proved that a juror prejudged the case as a
result of the bias or prejudice.' 19 In Compton v. Henrie' 20 the supreme
court considered a case in which a juror displayed hostility toward both
the type of lawsuit and the person who brought it. The juror repeatedly
testified that he did not believe in bringing a lawsuit to collect for personal
injuries, that he had been in a wreck and had made no claim for benefits,
and that he would not want anyone to "bleed" him.' 2' The supreme court
ruled that there was no material misconduct since the statements of the
juror revealed no prejudgment or implication of partiality. 22 In Strange v.
Treasure City' 23 the supreme court considered a situation in which a juror,
for unknown reasons, was prejudiced toward the plaintiff. The juror
demonstrated that she was prejudiced in the plaintiff's favor by stating that
she "had personal reasons to give [plaintiff] as much money as possi-
ble."' 124 The supreme court found that the statement was misconduct but
did not cause the defendant probable injury.125 These two supreme court
cases indicate the reluctance of the courts to grant new trials based on bias
and prejudice.
B. Acts Causing Probable Injury
The second element of jury misconduct is probable injury. In order to
overturn a jury verdict for misconduct, the complainant must demonstrate
116. 516 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id at 451.
118. Id
119. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594 (Sept. 12, 1980); Compton v.
Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1963).
120. 364 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1963).
121. Id at 180. On voir dire examination the juror had refused to admit that he was
prejudiced against personal injury suits.
122. Id at 182.
123. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 596-97 (Sept. 12, 1980).
124. Id at 596.
125. Id. at 597.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct probably caused
injury. 26 The probable injury rule has always been used to prevent jury
verdicts from being overturned because of trivial and inconsequential er-
ror. 127 In recent years, Texas courts have demonstrated an increasing ten-
dency to find that the jury misconduct did not result in probable injury to
the complainant. In order to determine whether probable injury resulted,
courts have consistently looked to several factors.
Nature and Subject Matter of Misconduct. Some forms of misconduct are
treated more seriously than others. For example, the mere occurrence of
jury tampering has been held to be evidence of probable harm,' 28 while
the mention of insurance, 129 attorneys' fees, ' 30 or the comparative wealth
of the parties have traditionally been found not harmful. 13' If these state-
ments are repeated and are shown to have a definite effect on the jury's
verdict, however, they will be deemed to constitute probable harm. 32
Statements of Fact or Opinion. The courts have adopted the view that a
juror's statement that he knows something as a matter of fact is more
harmful than the expression of an opinion.133 For example, in Trousdale v.
Texas & New Orleans Railroad,'34 a personal injury case, a juror stated
that the answers to the negligence and unavoidable accident issues were
immaterial after the damage issue had been answered. The supreme court
held that the statement was material misconduct,' 35 but since it was a
statement of opinion, it did not result in probable injury. 136 Expressions of
fact, however, are often found to be harmful.' 37 For example, in Scoggins
v. Curtiss & Taylor' 38 the supreme court reversed the trial court and court
of civil appeals when it was demonstrated that several jurors made various
factual comments during the jury deliberation. 13 9 One juror stated that the
plaintiff was not a poor man and needed no consideration. Another juror
126. Id. at 595; Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
959 (1969).
127. R. RAY, supra note 18, § 394.
128. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McCaslin, 159 Tex. 273, 317 S.W.2d 916 (1958).
129. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594 (Sept. 12, 1980); Putman v. Laza-
rus, 156 Tex. 154, 293 S.W.2d 493 (1956).
130. See note 66 supra.
131. McAllen Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Alvarez, 581 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
132. Kastanos v. Ramos, 581 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
133. Trousdale v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 154 Tex. 231, 276 S.W.2d 242 (1955).
134. 154 Tex. 231, 276 S.W.2d 242 (1955).
135. Id. at 235, 276 S.W.2d at 244.
136. Id at 237, 276 S.W.2d at 245.
137. Crawford v. Detering Co., 150 Tex. 140, 237 S.W.2d 615 (1951); Elston v. Sherman
Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper Co., 596 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
The Elston court reversed the trial court's refusal to overturn the verdict when it was estab-
lished that jurors stated that they knew of jobs the plaintiff could obtain. Id. at 217.
138. 148 Tex. 15, 219 S.W.2d 451 (1949).
139. 148 Tex. at 19, 219 S.W.2d at 453; accord City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex.
282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).
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claimed to have personal knowledge of the scene of the accident that sup-
ported the defendant's theory of the case. The Eastland court reached
such a conclusion in Vincent v. Goodman i40 when jurors recalled personal
experiences similar to the facts in controversy since it held that personal
experiences were statements of fact.14
Casual Versus Significant Conduct. Another important consideration of
the reviewing court is whether the act of misconduct is casual or signifi-
cant. If a juror makes a remark only once, there may be no probable in-
jury. If the misconduct is continuously repeated by the jury, however, a
finding of probable injury is mandated. 142 For example, the mere mention
of attorneys' fees has routinely been found not to cause injury.143 In Kas-
tanos v. Ramos, 144 however, the jury's obsession with attorneys' fees, as
evidenced by the jury's note to the judge asking what percentage of the
recovery would go to the attorney, required a reversal. 145 Additionally,
the number of jurors involved in the misconduct is significant, since the
involvement of a larger number of jurors is more likely to result in in-
jury. 146 Conversely, because rule 292147 allows a split of ten against two in
the verdict, if only one juror was affected by the misconduct, no probable
injury is established. 48
Rebuke by Jurors or Court. Texas courts have readily found that a rebuke
of misconduct can cure any harm, 14 9 because the court considers the re-
buke to be equivalent to the court's reprimand of the misconduct. 50 In
Dutton v. Southern Pacfic Transportation'5' one juror, confused by the
court's definition of proximate cause, looked up the word "proximate" in a
pocket dictionary and related it to the jnry. The foreman promptly re-
buked the juror and reread the court's definition. The trial judge found
that the juror's dictionary search was material misconduct but did not
cause probable injury.' 52 While probable harm can be negated by the re-
140. 568 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
141. Id. at 909-10.
142. Kastanos v. Ramos, 581 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, no writ).
143. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 597 (Sept. 12, 1980); McAllen
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Alvarez, 581 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ).
144. 581 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
145. Id at 742.
146. Pope, supra note 25, at 364.
147. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
148. State Highway Dep't v. Pinner, 531 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1975, no writ).
149. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 597-98 (Sept. 12, 1980); Putman v.
Lazarus, 156 Tex. 154, 293 S.W.2d 493 (1956); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
150. Pope, supra note 25, at 366.
151. 561 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'don other grounds, 576 S.W.2d 782
(Tex. 1978).
152. 561 S.W.2d at 896. The court also ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove that the
definition in the dictionary was different from the court's charge.
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buke of a fellow juror, misconduct following the rebuke will not be
cured. 5 3
The Point in the Deliberation when the Misconduct Occurred. Texas courts
have recognized that the time at which the misconduct occurs during the
jury's deliberation can be crucial in establishing probable injury. The
supreme court has refused to consider whether probable harm existed
when no proof was presented as to when during the deliberation the mis-
conduct occurred. 5 4 The time of the misconduct in the deliberation is
important because jury misconduct that occurs after the jury has answered
the issues usually does not cause probable injury.5 5 On the other hand,
misconduct that occurs during discussions of vital issues may well be criti-
cal.' 56 For example, in the recent case of Kastanos v. Ramos 57 the jury's
note to the judge asking what percentage of the award would be paid to
the plaintiff's attorney, coupled with jurors' testimony about the considera-
tion of attorneys' fees, was an indication that the jurors' misconduct oc-
curred at a crucial time during the deliberations. The Houston [14th
District] court of civil appeals found that since the misconduct occurred
during the consideration of damages the misconduct constituted probable
harm. 158
Changes in Jury Votes and Damage Amount. While jurors may not testify
as to the ways in which they were influenced, they may testify as to how
they stood numerically on the issues before and after the misconduct, 59
since evidence of changed votes or damages may be indicative of probable
injury. 60 In some cases, a change of vote is no indication of probable
harm because of a "natural inclination on the part of [a] small minority to
go along ultimately with the majority."' 6' In the majority of cases, how-
ever, evidence of a change in vote or damage amount after an act of mis-
conduct will warrant a finding of probable injury.
153. Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Long, 140 Tex. 494, 168 S.W.2d 642 (1943).
154. Mrs. Baird's Bread Co. v. Hearn, 157 Tex. 159, 300 S.W.2d 646, 649 (1957); see
Pope, supra note 25, at 371, in which Justice Pope emphasizes the court's reliance on the
time of the misconduct:
[Miost cases place some emphasis upon the point at which the misconduct
occurred, for the time factor may render an error either reversible or harmless.
If misconduct touching an issue occurs before the jury votes upon the issue,
prejudice is more probable than if the misconduct occurs after the vote.
155. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
156. Lewis v. Yaggi, 584 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
157. 581 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
158. Id at 742.
159. See Trousdale v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 154 Tex. 231, 276 S.W.2d 242 (1955); White
Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200 (1947); Roming v. McDonald, 514 S.W.2d 129
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200 (1947); City of Houston v.
Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).
161. Trousdale v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 154 Tex. 231, 237, 276 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1955).
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The Entire Record. In considering whether the alleged act of misconduct
caused probable injury, the courts consider the "record as a whole.' ' 62
Accordingly, the effect of the misconduct is weighed against all of the evi-
dence introduced at trial in order to determine if the misconduct caused
probable harm. 163 As a result, if the evidence in the trial court overwhelm-
ingly favored the appellee, the misconduct may be found to be harmless; if
the result is a close one, however, the misconduct may be found to cause
probable harm.' 64 In considering probable harm, the supreme court has
repeatedly held that the complainant must demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it was the actual misconduct and not the state of
the evidence that resulted in an adverse verdict. 165 If the record shows that
the facts favored the appellee, the misconduct will be held harmless. 166 As
a result, the complainant must bring forth a complete record of the trial
court proceedings on appeal to be successful in reversing a judgment on
the jury's verdict. 167
Cumulative Error Rule. In determining probable injury, Texas courts have
recognized that while several minor acts of misconduct standing alone
would not cause probable injury, together they may result in injury. 168 In
interpreting cumulative error, courts have held that the rule "does not ab-
rogate the requirement to prove probable injury, caused by the several acts
of misconduct."' 169 The application of the rule, however, has not been con-
sistent. For example, in one case considerations of insurance and attor-
neys' fees were deemed to result in probable harm.' 70 In another case' 7'
jurors discussed attorneys' fees; the foreman stated from his personal
knowledge, that a settlement offer had been rejected; and the jury consid-
162. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969);
accord, Walker v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 155 Tex. 617, 291 S.W.2d 298 (1956); Bar-
rington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S.W.2d 462 (1943).
163. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969);
Western Textile Prods. Co. v. Sidran, 153 Tex. 21, 262 S.W.2d 942 (1953); Tudor v. Tudor,
311 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ re'dper curiam, 158 Tex. 559, 314 S.W.2d
793 (1958).
164. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969);
Walker v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 155 Tex. 617, 291 S.W.2d 298 (1956).
165. See, e.g., Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959
(1969); City of Galveston v. Hill, 151 Tex. 139, 246 S.W.2d 860 (1952).
166. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
167. Fountain v. Ferguson, 441 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); City
of Galveston v. Hill, 151 Tex. 139, 246 S.W.2d 860 (1952). In Fountain P. Ferguson the
supreme court identified the term "record as a whole" as being broadly construed to include
all parts of the trial court's proceedings that may "throw light" on the question of injury. As
a result, only parts of the statement of fact that could have no bearing on injury should be
omitted from the appellate record. The best practice is to submit the complete record of the
trial court's proceedings to the appellate courts.
168. Strange v. Treasure City, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 594, 598 (Sept. 12, 1980); Scoggins v.
Curtiss & Taylor, 148 Tex. 15, 219 S.W.2d 451 (1949); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez,
537 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
169. Lewis v. Yaggi, 584 S.W.2d 487, 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
170. Plains Creamery, Inc. v. Denny, 277 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954,
writ refd n.r.e.).
171. Lewis v. Yaggi, 584 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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ered that the plaintiff would probably remarry and, therefore, should not
receive a great deal of money. The court held, however, that this miscon-
duct did not result in cumulative error.172 Apparently, while the cumula-
tive error rule is still alive, the complainant must clearly demonstrate that
the combined acts of misconduct caused probable harm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Texas courts have surrounded the jury misconduct practice with a set of
complicated rules and procedures. Without exception, these rules and pro-
cedures are roadblocks to the granting of new trials based on jury miscon-
duct. The probable injury element of rule 327 was designed to prevent the
reversal of jury verdicts for trivial misconduct. The court's adoption of
other common law rules, however, has further complicated the complain-
ant's task. For example, the "implied findings" rule actually prevents ap-
pellate courts from reviewing many acts of misconduct when findings of
fact and conclusions of law are not filed. The uncodified affidavit require-
ment under rule 327, designed to prevent "fishing expeditions," serves as
another obstacle for the complainant.
The Texas supreme court also has shown a reluctance to interfere with
the jury's verdict unless the record demonstrates not only misconduct, but
a clear and convincing case of probable injury. In the balancing test
between finality of judgments and attempts to ensure fair jury trials, the
supreme court has adopted the view that the finality of jury verdicts should
outweigh other considerations. Post-judgment attacks on jury verdicts can
still be successful, however, if the practitioner understands and adheres to
the court's rules and procedures. To demonstrate misconduct that will re-
quire the overturning of a jury verdict, the complainant must prove an act
by the jurors or opposing party that amounts to a denial of the right to a
fair jury trial, and such act of misconduct must be shown by overt acts to
have affected the jurors' answers to special issues.
172. Id. at 496.
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